

Executive Registry

11-542

10 JAN 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Coordination)

SUBJECT: Possible Merger of USCSB and USIB

1. As the result of a discussion at a recent USIB meeting, General Cabell asked to be briefed for his information on the factors that should be considered concerning the possible merger of USCSB and USIB. At this briefing of General Cabell at which you, [redacted] and I participated the attached material was discussed. You will recall that General Cabell asked that I write it up for you to keep for reference purposes in the event that this issue is raised again. He stated that he did not intend to raise it. He stated that in his opinion the burden for justifying such a merger should fall to the agency that initiates the proposal.

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2. In our discussion the consensus appeared to be against such a merger because it had the effect of adding a national non-intelligence area of responsibility to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community. However, it was also apparent that such a merger would work if circumstances require it.

3. I have prepared the material in staff study form so that it can be used as a first draft of an agency position paper if such a paper is required.

[redacted]

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Director of Communications

[redacted]

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ILLEGIB

NSA review(s) completed.

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1/19/89

PROBLEM:

1. To establish a CIA position on the proposal that the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) should become a committee under the jurisdiction of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

ALTERNATIVES:

2. There are essentially four alternative courses of action which could be taken in this matter:

a. The USCSB could continue to operate as is with no change in its reporting channel to the National Security Council.

b. The USCSB could be merged with the USIB and the COMSEC function performed by a committee of the USIB on the same basis as the USIB COMINT and ELINT committees.

c. Joint meetings could be held for these few items of joint interest between the boards.

d. Certain USCSB functions could be transferred to the USIB.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

3. The USCSB was established ^{by NSC 5411} as a result of a Presidential Directive of 24 October 1952 in which the security of Federal communications (COMSEC) was identified as a national responsibility.

4. The USCSB consists of representatives of Defense, NSA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Treasury, AEC, FBI, and CIA. The members are communications and communications security officers or officials responsible for these functions.

5. The objective of the Board as stated by the Presidential Directive is to establish appropriate responsibility and authority to assure within various departments and agencies of the Government, among other things:

- a. High and uniform standards of communications security.
- b. Effective cooperation in COMSEC matters between departments and agencies concerned.
- c. The adequacy of the cryptographic systems used.
- d. Coordination of COMSEC problems, particularly policies with respect to foreign governments.
- e. Satisfaction of legitimate requirements for the security of telecommunications.

6. The USIB consists of essentially the same agency representation as the USCSB. It concerns itself with the acquisition of intelligence including COMINT and ELINT.

7. Since the USCSB has been operating, there has been essentially one area of common concern between the USIB and the USCSB. This is the improvement of communications security practices of foreign governments. The USIB with its COMINT knowledge of foreign COMSEC practices has an interest in improving these practices as a means of preventing the loss of intelligence from friendly nations to the Soviet bloc countries. On the other hand, the USIB is also interested in limiting improvements in the communications security of certain countries which are of interest to the intelligence community as a COMINT target.

8. Areas in which the USIB currently has no responsibility or interest include the establishment of high and uniform standards of communications security, the adequacy of cryptographic system, and the satisfaction of legitimate requirements for the security of telecommunications. These areas

of interest are fundamentally the responsibility of operating communications officials of each of the Government agencies that now constitute the membership of the USCSB.

CONCLUSIONS:

9. The COMSEC function if continued as a national responsibility can better be administered through operating communications elements in the Government rather than intelligence elements.

10. The transfer of the USCSB function to the USIB would enlarge the responsibility and interest of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community into national areas of responsibility which are not related to intelligence.

RECOMMENDATION:

11. It is recommended that the USIB and the USCSB not be merged.

Attachments:

1. Present USCSE Membership
2. List of USCSE Agenda Items
3. Example of Cryptographic
Equipment Planning Paper (BCER) w/orig only

Reference: NSC 5711

USCSB MEMBERSHIP

1.	General G. E. Erskine	Defense	Chairman
2.	Mr. L. W. Parke	State	
3.	Mr. D. E. Moore	Justice	
4.	Mr. J. P. Weitzel	Treasury	
5.		NSA	
6.		CIA	
7.	Captain J. H. Morse, Jr.	AEC	
8.	Maj. General J. M. Willems	Army	
9.	Rear Admiral F. Virden	Navy	
10.	Maj. General H. W. Grant	Air Force	
11.		Exec. Sec'y	

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AGENDA

- | | | | | | |
|------|----|----------|---|--|------|
| 5X1 | 1. | 1/12/53 | Election of Chairman
Staff for Board
[redacted] | (USCSB)
(USCSB)
(Joint) | |
| | 2. | 3/6/54 | Panels & vote sheet
Meeting joint with USCIB | (USCSB) | |
| | 3. | 29/7/55 | [redacted]



Extracts from Appendix I of Hoover
Commission Report
U. S. COMSEC | (USCSB with
USCIB opinion)
(USCSB with
USCIB opinion)

(USCSB)
(USCSB) | 25X1 |
| | 4. | 17/10/55 | NATO COMSEC

U. S. transmission security | (Transferred from USCIB
to USCSB)
(USCSB) | |
| | 5. | 22/8/56 | [redacted] | (USCSB)
(USCSB)
(USCSB)
(USCSB) | 25X1 |
| | 6. | 21/2/57 | NSC 168 | (USCSB) | |
| 25X1 | 7. | 3/11/58 | [redacted] | (USCSB)
(USCSB subject
to USIB concurrence) | |

VOTE SHEETS

- | | | | | |
|------|-------|-------------------|-------|------|
| | 2-/3 | [redacted] | USCSB | 25X1 |
| | 2-/19 | [redacted] | Joint | |
| | 2-/25 | COMSEC Assistance | USCSB | |
| 25X1 | 2-/26 | [redacted] | USCSB | |
| | 2-4/2 | [redacted] | USCIB | |
| | 2-4/3 | [redacted] | Joint | |
| | 2-4/5 | [redacted] | USCIB | |

25X1	2-5/1		Joint	
	2-6/1		USCSB with USCIB	
	2-6/4		consurrence	
	2-11/1		USCSB	
	2-11/3		USCIB	
	2-8/1		USCSB	
5X1	3-/1		USCSB	
	3-/10		USCIB/USCSB	
		NATO COMSEC	Transferred to USCSB	
5X1	3-1/4		from USCIB	
	4-/1		USCSB	
	5-/13	NSC 168	USCSB	
5X1	2-15/4		USCSB	
	2-15/5		USCIB	
	2-26/1		USCSB	
	5-/15		Joint	25X1
	7-/5		Joint	
	7-1/1	Tran. Sec working group	USCSB	
	7-1/10	Link encryption	USCSB	
	7-1/16	U. S. COMSEC objectives	USCSB	
	7-/2	U. S. COMSEC	USCSB	
25X1	7-3/2		USCSB	
	7-3/4		USCSB	
5X1	12-1/1		USCSB	
	10-		Joint	
			USCSB	

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SECRET

31 October 1958

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PLAN

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. BACKGROUND
- B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
- C. ORGANIZATION OF PLAN
- D. DEFINITIONS

II. FUTURE ENVIRONMENT OF U. S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

- A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
- B. STRATEGIC ESTIMATE
 - 1. Geopolitics
 - 2. Characteristics of War
 - 3. Weapons, Forces and Facilities
- C. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
 - 1. Systems
 - 2. Modes of Communication
 - 3. Transmission
 - 4. Equipment Design Techniques
- D. NEED FOR COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

III. CRYPTOSECURITY

- A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
 - 1. Objectives
 - 2. Definitions

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- B. CRYPTOSECURITY STANDARDS
- C. BASIC CRYPTO-EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
- D. REQUIREMENTS FOR CODES AND NON-MACHINE CIPHERS
- E. PRODUCTION OF CRYPTOMATERIALS

- 1. Crypto-Equipment
- 2. Variable components
- 3. Cryptosystem Keying Material
- 4. One-Time Tapes, One-Time Pads
- 5. Codes

F. CRYPTOSYSTEM OPERATION

- 1. General Instructions (Doctrine)
- 2. System Instructions (Procedures)
- 3. Training of Operating and Maintenance Personnel

G. SURVEILLANCE

- 1. Monitoring
- 2. Reporting
- 3. Compromise Evaluation

IV. TRANSMISSION SECURITY

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 1. Objectives
- 2. Definitions

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
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B. PROTECTION AGAINST INTERCEPTION

1. Frequency Changing
2. Protection Against Radiation
3. Approved Circuits
4. Ultra-High Speed Transmissions ("Burst" Systems)
5. Infra-Red Transmissions
6. Other Interceptor Resistant Transmissions

C. PROTECTION AGAINST RECOGNITION OR IDENTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE-BEARING TRANSMISSIONS

1. Noise Communications Systems
2. Traffic Flow Security



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D. PROTECTION AGAINST TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

1. Abolition of Plain Language Message Texts
2. Abolition of Plain Language Message Externals

E. PROTECTION AGAINST IMITATIVE DECEPTION

1. Authentication
2. Operator Training

V. PHYSICAL SECURITY

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1. Objectives
2. Definitions

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B. PERSONNEL CLEARANCE STANDARDS

1. Clearances for Military Personnel
2. Clearances for Civilian Personnel
3. Clearances for Alien Personnel

C. DESIGNATION AND CATEGORIZATION OF CRYPTOMATERIAL

D. PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDING OF CRYPTOMATERIAL

1. In Production, Transit, and Storage
2. In Registration, Custody, and Installation
3. In Reporting, Supersession, and Destruction

VI. COMMUNICATIONS COVER AND DECEPTION

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1. Objectives
2. Definitions

B. COVER AND DECEPTION REQUIREMENTS

(VII.) (INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (TENTATIVE))

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